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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to present an overview of fraud, including concepts,
trends, and controls to in turn, develop an effective assurance work plan as well as a fraudprevention proposal to a potential client. When KPMG collected data from 348 of their
company fraud investigations in 2011, an average of 87 percent were male (3). Around
thirty-two percent of fraudsters usually worked in a finance role which gave them access
to assets and financial statements. According to Donald Cressy’s research, it takes all three
elements to be considered fraud: a triangle of motivation, opportunity, and rationalization.
However, in the 2004 CPA Journal, David T. Wolfe and Dana R. Hermanson discussed
the addition of another element from their research to create a fraud diamond, which also
includes the individual’s capacity. Compared to public companies, fraud occurs more
frequently in privately owned companies. Nearly 40 percent of victim organizations in the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ 2012 study were privately owned while 28
percent were publicly traded. Furthermore, fraud is more likely to be detected by
individuals in the internal or external audit setting or an anonymous tipline. These concepts
are explained further in sections of the assurance engagement team plan and fraudprevention proposal to a small business owner.
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Trout 1

The Expectations Gap for Auditors is driven by two factors: the auditor’s aptitude
to detect fraud and the auditor’s efforts to detect fraud. (Zikmund).When performing an
audit for a company, auditors are either inexperienced or not willing to spend the time and
energy to perform the steps that stem from the red flags of auditing (Zikmund). To prevent
fraud, all accountants, internal or external, must develop fraud detection skills and a
mindset to discover fraud. (Zikmund). The purpose of this thesis is to present an overview
of fraud, including concepts, trends, and controls to in turn, develop an effective assurance
work plan as well as a fraud-prevention proposal to a potential client.

Overview of Fraud
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners first defined occupational fraud in
2002 as “the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through deliberate misuse or
misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets” (“Report to the
Nations” 2). There are four elements that must be fulfilled to be considered fraud: a
material false statement, the employee had knowledge that statement was false, the
company relied on the statement, and the company suffered damages because of the
activity (Wells 8). There is fine line between fraud and abuse. While abusive practices like
surfing the internet while at work and using sick leave when not sick might cause the
company to lose resources, they do not constitute fraud (11). Occupational fraud can be
divided into three general categories: asset misappropriation, corruption, and fraudulent
financial statements, as shown in the fraud tree on the following page.
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“Fraud Tree” acfe.com

Asset Misappropriation focuses on theft of cash and the misuse of a company’s
assets, particularly inventory (Wells 41). If a store employee has been fired and the
manager is still reporting their payroll after their termination to pocket the paycheck, this
is considered asset misappropriations as a ghost employee. Corruption is caused by
wrongful acts in which fraudsters use their influence for a benefit, like bribery, conflict of
interest and extortion (41). The Fraudulent Financial Statements category involves
misreporting financial statements on purpose to mislead analysts, investors, or creditors
(41). Employees can overstate assets/revenue or understate liabilities/expenses in order to
make financial statements look more appealing to shareholders or potential investors.
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Typical Attributes of a Fraudster
When mentioning white-collar crime like fraud, many accountants and accounting
students already have a predefined image in their head of the perpetrator. Big 4 firm,
KPMG, describes the typical attributes of fraudsters to be “male, ages 35-46, in a senior
management position” (“Profile of a Fraudster” 1). When KPMG collected data from 348
of their company fraud investigations in 2011, an average of 87 percent were male (3).
Around thirty-two percent of fraudsters usually worked in a finance role which gave them
access to assets and financial statements (4). Fraudsters working in the CEO’s office or an
operational/sales role were both just under thirty percent (4). Furthermore, over sixty
percent of fraudsters worked in senior management position, such as chief executive (4).
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiner’s Report to the Nations issued in 2012
produced similar results from CFE surveys. Two-thirds of the fraudsters were male and
the two highest percentages in age range were 36-40/41-45(“Report to Nations” 46). Data
differed with the fraudster’s position. The position of employee had the highest percentage
of fraudulent cases with 41 percent, compared to senior managers and top executives
(“Report to Nations” 39). However, the average dollar amount lost from an executive
committing fraud in the US was the highest amount at $373,000, almost seven times that
of the median loss of employees. (“Report to Nations” 31). While fraud can be mandominated, women do commit fraud. A global comparison showed that women in the
Americas (22 percent) and Asia Pacific (23 percent) are almost three times more likely to
be involved in fraud than in Europe (8 percent) (“Profile of a Fraudster” 3). This could be
due to fewer European women in top management positions.
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Fraud Triangle
While there are common attributes of a fraudster, the situational aspect of fraud is
also important. Donald Cressy researched fraud to hypothesize “Trusted persons become
trust violators when they conceive of themselves as having a financial problem which is
nonshareable and are aware this problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the
position of financial trust…” (Wells 13). This conclusion has led to the concept of the
fraud triangle: motivation, opportunity, and rationalization (see graphic). Motivation is
the perceived nonsharable financial need or “driving force” behind the act (Biegelman and
Bartow 33). It is usually caused by greed as described by “living beyond one’s means”,
addiction, family circumstances, or the pressure to pay debts. (33). At times, revenge, ego,
or the pressure to perform can play an alternative role instead of greed (33). The second
factor is opportunity, which is determined by position of authority and access to resources
(34). Fraudsters must have the opportunity to commit fraud as a result of weak internal
controls, lack of supervision, and/or poor ethical culture (Dorminey et al.). This is the only
element that can be prevented if companies are proactive in their risk management, internal
controls, and fraud prevention programs (Biegelman and Bartow 35). Rationalization
justifies the fraudulent activity by cognitive reasoning like “I was only borrowing the
money; This is not much money so the company won’t miss it; I’ll stop once I get over
this financial hump; The company owes it to me, etc” (35). When fraudsters justify
embezzling money by persuading themselves they will pay it back, this payback usually
does not occur (Dorminey et al.). Fraudsters rationalize the fraud in order to consider their
action acceptable.
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Fraud Diamond
According to Cressy’s research, it takes all three elements to be considered fraud.
However, in the 2004 CPA Journal, David T. Wolfe and Dana R. Hermanson discussed
the addition of another element from their research to create a fraud diamond (see graphic
below), which also includes the individual’s capacity (Dorminey et al.). In previous major
scandals, there has been one individual or set of individuals with the right capability,
meaning personal traits and abilities that set everything in motion.

The Fraud Triangle

The Fraud Diamond

During a speaking engagement in 2013, WorldCom controller David Myers takes
responsibility for his acts involving fraudulent financial statements and journal entries. Yet
he also admits that he trusted Chief Financial Officer Scott Sullivan as Sullivan used his
capacity to tell Myers and other employees to manipulate journal entries. Myers expected
Sullivan to handle any issues if they arose (Myers). In 2005, William Black created the
term “control fraud” by studying activities where the CEO or other top executives used the
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organization for personal gain (734). He also provided a description for “red-collar” to
define white-color criminals who become violent and demanding to their employees as
they try to hide their fraudulent actions (734). While red-collar crime and control fraud
represent extreme cases of fraud, it still relates to the broad category of the fraud diamond
term, capacity.

Magnitudes of Loss
The biggest magnitudes of loss with fraud are related to cost and reputation even
though the loss varies with each case. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
estimates around five percent of all revenue is lost to fraud each year (“Report to Nations”
4). Hypothetically, if a company has a reported net revenue of one million dollars, the
ACFE estimate predicts that $50,000 of it is lost to fraud within the company. The median
loss based on business size will be discussed further in the ‘Trends of Fraud’ section as
well as a Cost-Benefit Analysis for fraud prevention controls in the client proposal. The
size of the fraud can also impact the company stakeholders’ opinion. If the company cannot
recover their financial losses, employees might be laid off. Investors will evaluate whether
or not they should continue doing business with the company. Lastly, the consequences
from the fraud—i.e., employees let go, bad publicity--could change customers’ view. Even
if the company recovers from the fraud financially, the consumer’s negative opinion of the
company image and reputation could affect the business continuity.
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Punishments
Most fraudsters who are caught will have their punishments determined by the
company, based on the notion if they decide to pursue legal actions. To summarize the
punishments exacted on fraudsters presented in the 2012 Report to the Nations, around
65.4 percent of fraud investigations are handed over to police (61). When Sarbanes-Oxley
was implemented, it created and amended specific statutes fraudsters are faced with if their
cases are prosecuted (Biegelman and Bartow 75). Convictions of certain activities like
“Destruction, Alternation, or Falsification of Records in Federal Investigations and
Bankruptcy” result in a fine, up to 20 years imprisonment, or both (75). The Securities
Fraud statute provides penalties of a fine and/or imprisonment of a maximum of 25 years
if a criminal is convicted of defrauding public company shareholders (75). The following
table presents a comparison of convictions of two highly-publicized scandals versus a
smaller scandal. However, it should be noted that they are roughly eleven years apart.
Company
Year
Fraud
Amount/Type
CEO
Conviction

WorldCom
2002
$3.8 billion dollars
Financial Statement Fraud
Bernie Ebbers convicted
to 25 years in jail

CFO/Partner
Conviction

Steve Sullivan convicted
to 5 years in jail
Controller David Myers
convicted to 1 year and 1
day
The Executive Roadmap

Source

Tyco
2002
$600 million
Securities Fraud
Dennis Kozlowski served
8.7 years in a sentence up
to 25 years
Mark Schwartz served 8.4
years in a sentence up to
25 years- Total both paid
$104 million in restitution
and $105 million in fines
The Executive Roadmap

RH Holdings(Southhaven, MS)
2013
$5 Million Dollar Loan
Credit Application Fraud
Contractor James Harris convicted to
21 months in prison and $247,467 in
restitution
Partner Chuck Roberts served 10
days in prison for crime

http://www.desototimes.com
(3/29/14)

As the table shows, even ten years ago, a fraud worth several hundred millions or even
billons resulted in several years of jail time. CEO Bernie Ebbers is currently still serving
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his 25 year sentence. In a small Mississippi town, Harris was convicted to almost two years
of jail time for a fraud of 5 million dollars.
Alternatively, in 2012, 34.8 percent of fraud was not referred to law enforcement
as listed in the 2012 Report to Nations (61). As shown in the graph below, companies do
not often report fraud because they fear bad publicity toward the company or the company
feels their disciplinary actions are sufficient (61)

“Reason(s) Case Not Referred to Law Enforcement “, 2012 Report to Nations, Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners

However, because of their reasoning, fraudsters are getting the chance to
potentially continue their crime at another business. According to the 2014 PwC
Global Economic Crime Survey, approximately eighty percent of fraudsters were
dismissed from the company, yet only forty-nine percent were reported to law
enforcement (49). Many fraudsters are essentially allowed to walk free. Since they
were not prosecuted, nothing shows up on a pre-employment background check
and they are able to continue their tactics at a new company.
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Fraud in Private Companies versus Public Companies
Compared to public companies, fraud occurs more frequently in privately owned
companies. Nearly 40 percent of victim organizations in ACFE 2012 study were
privately owned while 28 percent were publicly traded (“Report to Nations” 25).
Because private companies are not regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, they have fewer protocols to follow and do not have the internal controls
public companies do. Private companies focus primarily on the profitability and financial
standing of their business. The Banking and Financial Services, Government and Public
Administration, Manufacturing, Healthcare, and Education industries are the top five
industries most susceptible to fraud (“Report to Nations” 28). Since these industries
require a high proportion of financial reporting and accounting as well as a large number
of employees, it is understandable they have the most cases of frauds.

Fraud in Non-Profit Organizations
While most fraud occurs in for-profit industries, there are some occurrences in the
nonprofit sector. Around ten percent of fraud cases have been investigated in non-profit
organizations, compared to a combined approximate of seventy percent in for-profit
industries (“Report to Nations” 25). Theft of cash and kickbacks/bribery were the most
common types of fraud committed in non-profit organizations with the most non-profit
frauds occurring in organizations with very few volunteers (Buckhoff and Parham 54).
With no volunteers, officials committing fraud can easily hide their actions as they do not
have to worry about many people examining the non-profit finances.
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Fraud in Churches
Magnifying the non-profit sector, churches actually lose a large amount of money
to fraud each year. The Status of Global Mission’s 2014 Report concluded that around the
world, an estimated 39 billion dollars is budgeted annually for ecclesiastical crime, which
is considered money embezzled by top custodians of religious money (29). Perpetrators
use their personal relationships with fellow believers in the church to partake in dishonest
activities. Since churches typically give all their proceeds to religious activities and
missions, very little time or money is spent on internal controls. This makes it easier for
fraudsters to gain the trust of church officials as well as gain access to the church offering
or finances to use for their personal expense. While churches publish their financial
statements and budgets to inform the congregation, churches are not required to be audited
by accountants. Additionally, churches are usually tax-exempt so the IRS only audits if
they have a notion of illegal activity ("Tax Information for Churches and Religious
Organizations").

Trends of Fraud
Tracing Fraud over Time
Since many fraud occurrences are not detected or not turned into legal
investigations, the rise or decline of fraud cases over time is not clear. According to the
Report of Nations surveys from 1996 to 2012, fraud has been exposed as either five or six
percent of yearly revenue. In PwC’s Global Economic Crime Survey for 2014, their
research concluded the reported rate of economic crime around the world had increased
from thirty percent in 2009 to thirty-seven percent in 2014 (5). In 2011, the rate was from
the report was in the middle at thirty-four percent (5). Though, by surveying Certified
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Fraud Examiners each year, data does show annual trends pertaining to specific details of
fraud. As shown in the graph below, the median loss of small businesses versus large
businesses has fluctuated since 1996. The average loss decreased until 2006, when it
increased significantly.

Annual Median Loss Based on Business Size
$250,000

$225,000
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Business
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SOX
Economic
Crisis

$200,000
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“Size of Victim Organization — Median Loss”, Report to the Nations, ACFE, 1996-2012

The light blue line on the graphs notes the creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July,
2002, which could have had an effect on the decrease of fraud loss. Additionally, the dark
blue line depicts the Economic Crisis in 2008. The median loss of fraud increased
significantly around this time when companies and individuals were struggling financially.

Economy’s Effect on Fraud
Furthermore, this data can predict that the trends of fraud are affected by the general
economy. Shown by the dark blue line on the graph, the economic crisis of 2008, including
the housing bubble and economic recession, impacted fraud heavily. An additional ACFE
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survey tested this theory as they received responses in February and March 2009 from 507
Certified Fraud Examiners. Ninety-two examiners found a significant increase in fraud and
189 examiners discovered a slight increase (“Occupational Fraud” 5). The average dollar
amount of fraud also increased by almost 49 percent (5). During the recession, aside from
living beyond one’s means and financial difficulties, businesses were also faced with the
pressure to succeed despite the poor economic circumstances. The recession study found
that of the frauds detected at around this time, forty-nine percent happened because of
increased pressure. (“Occupational Fraud” 6). ACFE President James D. Ratley reiterated
this by stating “Desperate people do desperate things.” (14).

Companies must reduce

expenses to maintain revenue and since internal controls “do not contribute to the bottom
line”, they can be one of the first expenses to be decreased. (14).

“Types of Fraud Observed to Have Increased During Past Year,” Occupational Fraud: A Study of the Impact of
Economic Recession

However, data conflicted when researching the change in the three types of fraud
during the Economic Crisis. The ACFE survey about the Recession showed that all types
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of fraud increased significantly in the time between 2008 and 2009 as in the graph above
(9). Yet when comparing the percent changes of the ACFE Report to the Nations from 2008
to 2010 (next page), none of the categories showed dramatic increases. In fact, two types,
corruption and financial statement fraud, decreased in percentage. Taking the survey details
into account, this could have been caused by the difference in sample sizes and sample
respondents.

“Occupational Frauds by Category (U.S. only), Report to the Nations, 2010, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners

Media’s Effect on Fraud
Media has little impact on actual fraud but has more influence on informing the
public after it has been detected and investigated. Unless journalists are given insider tips,
they have no way of knowing fraud was occurring in the company until it was publicly
announced. Once details of the fraud are released to the public, news stations can then
report on it. Media is also impacted by the size of the fraud relative to the company. Most
U.S. adults could probably name top frauds that have occurred in the past ten years just
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based on media attention. Publicly traded Fortune 500 companies receive more commerce
than small-town businesses; therefore, the public is more likely to be interested in the
public companies when fraud occurs.
Social media could play a large role in detecting fraudulent activity by providing
evidence on the activities of a fraudster. If a tip is turned in about an employee’s possible
theft of company money to fuel a gambling addiction or management notices an employee
living beyond their means, websites like Facebook and Twitter can indicate if he or she
has visited a casino or store recently through pictures, statuses, and check-ins. Postings
can even be traced to geographic coordinates if the settings are turned on. While it might
be difficult to prove the crime completely off of social media, it could provide helpful
evidence towards the fraud case.

Cyber-Fraud
Cyber-crime has a three point definition; therefore, each point represents a separate
concept. The first part of the definition includes cyber-fraud and describes as “traditional
crime like fraud or forgery carried out over electronic communication networks and
information systems” (“European Commission”). The second part of cybercrime is related
to illegal activity over the electronic media like child pornography as well the third section
which details crimes against networks like hacking or attacking an information system
(“European Commission”). While each point is a different way to commit crime, they are
usually grouped together under the phrase cyber-crime. As technological activities
increase exponentially, cyber-crime is also increasing as shown in the graphic below.
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“Global Economic Crime Survey”, PwC, 2014

Nearly all companies conduct business using technology and the internet. Trends
of cloud computing, mobile technology, data mining, and video conferencing are quickly
infiltrating into the business world. Technology has impacted the accounting profession as
a large majority of businesses use Accounting Information Systems and Enterprise
Resource Planning system, like SAP and Oracle, to automate accounting processes. As
technology expands further into the business world, new issues, specifically in the area of
intellectual property, arise. Robert King is a CPA, CVA, and CFE at the consulting firm,
The Koerber Company, in Hattiesburg, MS, which specializes in forensic accounting and
litigation. Based on his experiences, he has realized that this is becoming a big issue
because IT officials can relocate from one company to another and steal a company’s
proprietary information for their own benefit (King). Since companies survive by doing
things better than their competitor, any theft, especially intellectual property, could
seriously impact finances.
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Greatest Percentages of Cyber Threats
in US
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“US State of Cybercrime”, PwC, 2013

While increased technology has provided more ways to commit fraud, the main
perpetrators of cybercrime are disgruntled employees, hackers, and the government as
shown in the graph on the previous page. A small percent of sources also include activists
and organized crime.
With automated AISs, companies can enact general and application controls for
technology. If a company does not have these controls in place, they have a higher chance
that fraud will be committed. If company networks do not have both physical and logical
security measures, it can be very easy for someone without authority to gain access to
tangible assets like inventory and intangible assets through the Accounting Information
System. However, implementing controls specific to risk areas in the company can affect
the occurrence of fraud.
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Cybersecurity Initiatives
As cyber-crime rises, the government has taken action to help prevent cybercrime.
In the past few months, the Obama Administration issued a “Framework for Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” for nationwide security. This executive order sets
guidelines for organizations to manage cybersecurity risks by focusing on risk assessments
and response plans (Exec. Order No. 13636). Furthermore, the FBI has established
multiple task forces to help alleviate cybercrime like the National Cyber Investigative Joint
Task Force. This special force teams up with nineteen other intelligence agencies to help
detect cybercrime and the major culprits behind it, which are discussed in the section below
(“National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force”)

Social Demographics
Looking at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Cyber’s Most Wanted list, it should
be noted that of the ten individuals on the list, most of them have similar demographics.
All individuals were males and a majority were young adults (“Cyber’s Most Wanted”).
Nine out of the ten were born in between 1970 and 1990 and most had some background
in computer programming, telecommunications, or internet entrepreneurship (“Cyber’s
Most Wanted”). The ten most wanted represent a variety of European and Middle Eastern
nationalities. Additionally, as with the Cyber’s Most Wanted, most cybercrime occurs in
urban areas because cybercriminals have more network access there.

Trout 18

Undetected Fraud
When fraud goes undetected for a long period of time and is then found, specific
aspects of the business could really be in trouble. Fraud could seriously impact business
continuity depending on the level of financial stability of the company. Significant
financial losses due to fraud and fees resulting from the fraud could hurt company to the
point of bankruptcy or acquisitions. When reporting for undetected fraud on the financial
statements, a prior period adjustment could cover small amounts of fraud and disclose in
the footnotes depending on the level of materiality. If the fraud will impact the financial
statements considerably, they would need to reissue all prior financial statements for the
years fraudulent activity occurred. A product of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board committee might also get involved with the audit and assess
not only the company, but the external audit team responsible as well. If the fraud was
detected early and the company needed to report a net loss for the year, they could partake
in a deferred tax carryback or carryforward. However, if the fraud is detected too late, they
might not have this opportunity. Public perception of the company could also be damaged
if the fraud goes undetected for a long period of time. Customers could view it as
irresponsible and decrease their loyalty to the company. Competitors could use it to market
to lost customers. Many times businesses do not prosecute detected fraud once found in
order to save reputation and prevent bad publicity.
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Combating Fraud
There are three main types of controls in accounting: external controls, internal controls,
and codes of ethics. Each type attempts to control and prevent fraud as well as errors in a
different way by either regulations inside or outside of the company.
External Controls
The biggest external control that has affected the entire accounting world is the
formation and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. President
George W. Bush signed it on July 30, 2002 and stated, “Every corporate official who has
chosen to commit a crime can expect to face their consequences” (Biegelman and Bartow
68). It reinforces corporate accountability by promoting auditor independence as auditors
must rotate every 5 years and auditors are prohibited from offering any non-audit services
to the company (69). SOX also created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
which inspects public accounting firms and the audit process for their respective
companies (69). In addition to strengthening the independence of audit committees,
Sarbanes-Oxley requires company executives, like CEO and CFO, to verify and certify
financial statements (69). While it is hard to tell definitively if the number of fraud cases
has been reduced since SOX was recognized, it has established more structured rules and
guidelines in hopes of preventing fraud in the future.
The Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 99 also provided a turning point for
external controls involving fraud. SAS 99 gives external auditors the “responsibility to
plan and perform an audit to test whether financial statements are free of material
misstatements caused by error or fraud” (Biegelman and Bartow 82). The standard focuses
on planning/performing an audit by having brainstorming sessions and analytical reviews
to induce skepticism about fraud or errors and identify fraud risks. When external auditors
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find evidence of fraud, they must then report it to top management or the audit committee,
if the fraud involves top executives (Biegelman and Barlow 89).
Additionally, several task forces have been created to help investigate and prevent
major fraud from occurring. During the same month Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, Bush
started the Corporate Fraud Task Force (Biegelman and Bartow 19). This task force was
responsible for not only investigating all the major fraud scandals like Enron, Rite Aid,
and Adelphia, they also were in charge of prosecuting them. When Barak Obama became
the United States President, he replaced the Corporate Fraud Task Force with the Financial
Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Biegelman and Bartow 20). This new task force stresses
the investigation and future prevention of fraud caused by the economic crisis in 2008
(20). Likewise, the Securities and Exchange Commission started a similar task force, the
Financial Reporting and Audit Task Force, in 2013 to help regulate financial reporting by
public companies (Novack). Their main priority is to start a RoboCop initiative using the
new Accounting Quality Model (AQM) to test the risk involved with earnings
management. Craig Lewis, Chief Economist and Director of the Division of Risk, Strategy,
and Financial Innovation (“RSFI”) at the SEC, discussed that the RoboCop will be able to
detect when a company has high book earnings with an alternative tax treatment or a high
number of transactions that took place off the balance sheet (Novack). While the RoboCop
program has flaws, like its reliance on financial comparisons between companies in the
same industry, the RSFI is trying to improve upon it by incorporating word tests into the
AQM as well. Looking at a past fraudulent filings, RSFI analysts have developed lists of
words and phrasing choices which have been common amongst fraudulent filers and
turned into one of the elements in the AQM test (Novack). The automated process starts
the day after public companies turn their financial statements into Edgar (Novack). The
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RoboCop tests the statements against the AQM and a risk score is created, which is then
analyzed by the SEC to determine if the score is high or low on a scale of fraudulence
(Novack). External controls, such as laws and task forces, provide general rules and
guidelines for all companies to follow.

Internal Controls
While external controls set a foundation for rules and guidelines, internal controls
are implemented within the company for its own benefit with risk management. There are
three types of internal controls that focus on efficiency and effectiveness: preventative,
detective, and corrective. Before implementing internal controls, companies should
identify and evaluate the risks to their most valuable processes by doing an assessment.
Each company will focus on protecting the core processes. A retail store will have
inventory controls in place to protect their inventory and other assets. A corporation with
large data collections will have security controls, like locked computer storage facilities,
biometrics, and passwords. Similarly, a company who uses an Enterprise Resource
Planning system will give each employee an account with a strong password and access
limited to what their scope of work relies on.

Internal Audit
Having an internal audit department that is a separate subsystem from the
accounting department is an important function to internal controls for a company. They
perform operational audits to evaluate financials and operations independently of what the
rest of the company is reporting. The CFO decides what the internal audit team should
focus on annually, based on what has been audited in the past year and what the external

Trout 22

audit team is concentrating on (Golden et al. 165). While an internal audit team can
investigate fraud if it is detected, there is a point they must hand the investigation off to
consultants or specialists if it reaches beyond their scope (166).

Codes of Ethics
SOX also emphasized ethical values, as each company is now required to have
code of ethics for senior officials (Biegelman and Bartow 74). The Code of Ethics is
separate from a company’s mission statement, but the two could be harmonious. Walmart’s
Statement of Ethics for all employees includes a specific clause for financial reporting:

“Walmart requires honest and accurate recording and reporting of
financial information in order to make responsible business decisions.
All financial books, records, and accounts must accurately reflect
financial transactions and events. They must conform to generally
accepted accounting principles, and to Walmart’s system of internal
controls” (“Statement of Ethics”).

Despite the fact Walmart has global operations, all employees in all countries, from Chief
Financial Officer to a cashier dealing with cash transactions, must adhere to the Statement
of Ethics. Having a company-wide code of ethics provides ethical guidelines if an
employee’s integrity is in question.
Publicly-traded manufacturer and service provider, Johnson Controls, Inc, also has
a similar section in their code of ethics: “We ensure our books and records are accurate,
complete and maintained according to the law and industry best practices” (Roell, 22).
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Michael Barnes, Accounting Manager at the Johnson Controls plant location in
Hattiesburg, Mississippi, agrees that while ethics policies provide a good base point to
establish internal controls, they do not directly contribute to fraud prevention (“Ethics at
Johnson Controls”). If a fraudster has the motivation and opportunity, they will find a way
to bypass the controls, regardless of the ethics policy in place. The ethics policy also relates
to the concept of tone-at-the-top, which expects senior executives and management to be
models for all other employees. In his interview, Mr. Barnes also notes that tone-at-the top
in the control environment is very accurate as having good control leadership and the
policies in place go hand-in-hand (“Ethics at Johnson Controls”). Aside from ethical codes,
companies also must have whistleblower protection as described in Section 806 in
Sarbanes-Oxley (Biegelman and Bartow 263). Additionally, in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act
was passed to give whistleblowers compensation for their relevant information (263).

Assurance Opportunities with Fraud Investigation
Difference between External Auditors and Forensic Accountants
External Auditors and Forensic Accountants both work to detect and investigate
material fraud, but each have their own view of the task. In this analogy, an auditor could
be compared to a policeman and a forensic accountant investigator to a detective (Golden
et al. 22). An audit team analyzes financial statements for a company they have a contract
with. In their audit plan, they have specific steps to take to test for risk of fraud. A forensic
accountant usually is certified as Certified Fraud Examiner. They could work for either a
public firm in the Forensic and Fraud Services branch or for a consulting firm. They
specialize in fraud investigations and putting in controls to prevent future fraud risks. This
topic is further explained in the Work Plan subsection later on in this section.
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Fraud Investigations vary in cost on a case-by-case basis. Linda Trifone, Director at
BKD, LLP and Certified Fraud Examiner, gives an example of an actual case that had
fraud dating back 36 months and involved around $500,000 in stolen funds from the fraud
(Trifone). The accounting and legal costs to investigate were over $100,000 (Trifone). At
a consulting firm, the typical costs for services around $3,500 to 12,000 based on billable
hours (King). For fraud cases, a retainer is used to collect fees upfront (King). Cost can be
a deterrent for a fraud investigation and will be discussed later on in the Work Plan section.
Impact of Big Data on Fraud Investigation
Since more and more companies are collecting data and storing it in data
warehouses and data marts, fraud investigators have additional data to work with when
analyzing a fraud. The concept of big data is no longer a phenomenon but a reality that
can be used to prevent and investigate data for fraud. Investigators can use data mining to
efficiently look for suspicious findings by sorting and querying different scenarios like
“Round-Dollar Payments” and “Gaps, Voids, and Canceled Checks” in a database
(Golden et al. 408). Data-mining accounts for Benford’s Law, which is the notion that
fraudsters typically use a figure that begin with the number 9. This goes against the
assumption that the higher the number is, such as 7, 8, or 9, the less probable it will be the
first digit value in an amount (Biegelman and Bartow 319). Additionally, as more data is
collected and analyzed, more information goes into the ERP. This can help investigators
if they need to do a search instead of having to search through gigabytes of unstructured
data.
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Work Plan for Engagement Team
The beginning steps of a fraud investigation are
determined by the detection method. If top management
detects it, executives are already aware of what has
happened. From there, they can proceed quickly with
how they want to investigate the issue. If an internal

Management

Internal Audit
Tip via Hotline
External Audit

audit detects it first, they must first bring the issue to
management, who then decides how it is handled. This scenario started the WorldCom
investigation, even though management played a role in the financial statement fraud.
While tip hotlines are the largest way to detect, truthfulness is an issue. The reports can be
anonymous and anyone with access to the hotline can report so it could be a more lengthy
process to test the accuracy and truth to each fraud claim. However, the tip could be a
stepping stone for further investigation if it proves to be correct.
A typical engagement team includes a partner who assumes final responsibility, a
manager, an industry specialist, and a number of senior, associate, and intern staff
members (Robertson and Louwers 88). An interim engagement budget in terms of hours
could be 160 hours with a year-end engagement budget that increases to 175 hours (88).
Internal Control evaluation during the interim is budgeted to be around thirty hours and
planning the engagement to be twenty-five hours total (88). It is during this time that the
team conducts risk assessments for possible fraudulent activity. If fraud is detected at any
time during the engagement, the scope would shift from a financial statement audit to a
fraud investigation. The engagement team could bring in a specialist with fraud
investigation experience, usually a CFE with independence from the company being
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audited to make the investigation objective. This individual helps lead the team with the
partner and to teach inexperienced staff how to investigate fraud.
If fraud is found but it is not during an external audit, the executives can decide
how they want to proceed. If they believe the fraud may have a major impact, they can call
in a specialized team of fraud investigators, usually certified fraud examiners, using a
consulting firm who focuses on forensic accounting. They could also employ a Fraud and
Forensic Services team from a public accounting firm who they are not contracted with for
audit services. Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits firms from performing audit and non-audit
services for the same company.
Once the investigation starts, the first steps should be gaining an understanding and
gathering information and documents about the case (Golden et al 299). The engagement
team must then decide how to proceed with document review, identifying witnesses, and
holding interviews. The team must make arrangements if outside legal counsel is
requested.
However, since a fraud investigation can be very costly, the company could
proceed using internal audit if they were just looking for enough evidence to terminate the
employee committing fraud (Trifone). Prosecution makes the investigation much more
costly and in the end, the outcome of investigation might be unfavorable to the company.
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Client Fraud-Prevention Proposal
(Note: In this section, my team is presenting to a small business, a service provider,
with less than 100 employees. A majority of the employees work within the office
headquarters. It is assumed there is an owner, a general manager, and two assistant
managers who share responsibility of the company.)
For small businesses, the focus is on creating a successful and profitable company,
so having a large variety of expensive internal controls and risk management processes is
not feasible. Yet the lack of controls could lead to fraud. According to the ACFE’s Report
to Nations, businesses with less than 100 employees are the most common victims of fraud
(26). While data is skewed by the CFE report because few small businesses hire CFEs to
investigate the fraud, their research does show in 2012 that 31.8 percent of fraud cases
occurred in small businesses (26). This percent is up one percent from 2010 (26). Small
businesses were more susceptible to billing schemes, check tampering, skimming, and
expense reimbursements than larger companies with over one hundred employees (27).
After analyzing the company, we found that it is in the small business’ best interest
to invest in a fraud prevention program that they find is cost-effective to their net income.
Below is our proposal to a potential client, a small business owner, of the benefits of having
minimal internal controls to help prevent fraud. To lower costs, business owners could
focus on one main control for each category: prevention, detection, and response. Below
are considerations of basic internal controls that small businesses would benefit from.
• Communication and Training
•Segregation of Duties
Prevention •Enforcing Vacation Days

Detection

•Anonymous phone tipline, email, or Smart phone Application
•Police Force App

Response

•Fraud Response Plan
•Identify fraud risks/ Monitoring
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Preventative Measures
For prevention, our first suggestion would be planning and compiling policies,
procedures, and all other guidelines into a Company Handbook distributed to each new
employee starting at the company. Written procedures aid in training new staff on business
processes quickly. Newly-added procedures and controls could be communicated to
veteran employees via continuous training session presentations or informal material could
be distributed through a company memo. The guidelines and policies should reiterate the
company’s zero-fraud tolerance and state the punishment exacted on the fraudster if
caught. Secondly, the company should be structured (or restructured) to include
segregation of duties. This control helps avoid giving employees control of an entire
process. Essentially, one employee’s work serves as a check for another employee.
Management should assign tasks like authorizing transactions, recording transactions, and
maintaining custody of the assets to at least three different employees. The graphic
describes a second-level process map for the credit approval process for a customer
wanting the services offered by the company. Since it is a small company, owners should
keep a map of the processes with notes on what steps each employee or department is
responsible for.
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The owner and general manager should also mandate vacation days in the company
policies. One of the behavioral red flags of fraudsters is their refusal to take vacations
(Report to Nations, 2010). They know if they leave the company for a short amount of
time, their fraudulent activity could be detected. Mandatory vacation days would rotate the
job tasks to another employee or manager for a few days and fraud risks or even fraudulent
evidence could possibly be detected.

Detective Measures
In terms of detection of fraud, a method that has proven to be effective is the use
of anonymous hotlines/tiplines. Research has shown employees and others reporting fraud
like the anonymity and confidentiality it brings (Golden et al. 26). In 2012, tips were the
largest way to initially detect occupational fraud in any industry with a percent of around
43 percent, compared to management review (14 percent) and internal audit(14 percent)
(Report to Nations 14). Over fifty percent of tips were reported through employees but it
should be mentioned that twelve percent of tips were anonymously reported. Additionally,
tips were best reported with organizations that had hotlines at 51 percent versus those that
didn’t offer hotlines at 34.6 percent (17).This proves that using a tipline could increase
management’s knowledge and detection of ethical misbehavior/complaints and potentially
decrease fraud occurrences. Various companies specialize in their hotline services but the
cost of the services is based on a price estimate because of customization. A basic hotline
provider like AnswerNet or Fraud Hotline costs around $500 to 1140 dollars annually for
a small business of 100 employees (Andrews and LeBlanc.). The medium hotline service
providers such as Red Flag Reporting and Lighthouse services charge a minimum of $645
to 800 dollars for a company with 100 employees (Andrews and LeBlanc).
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A possible suggestion would be a tipline through a smartphone or computer
application instead of a telephone system. With technology increasing, people might be
more susceptible to report fraud if they can use their mobile phone or tablet. Little research
has been conducted for this idea but the average cost of developing an application with
lower-level complexity and a small feature list is around 50,000 dollars (SAP). An example
of a police department app that has similar features is below. Developers could link the
application to the AIS the company uses or have each report sent directly to management
or internal audit.

MPD Tip Cell Phone Application, City of Minneapolis

If a company is not collecting enough profits to have an anonymous hotline internal
control, management should still make it understood in the policies and procedures
handbook what to do to report a claim. The company could set up an additional phone
number or email address just for reports or the company could direct employees to utilize
local police department resources like CrimeStoppers hotline or the smart phone
application posted above by the City of Minneapolis Police Department.

Trout 31

Every company, no matter the size, should also have a fraud response plan.
Preventative programs will not stop all fraud so a company should have a plan of action in
place if fraudulent activity is detected. (Golden et al. 233). Below are components of the
sample fraud policy found on the BKD website:

By including this information in the employee handbook, all employees will be aware of
the actions and consequences faced with committing fraud. The manager and owner
should also frequently spend a significant amount of time assessing controls for fraud risk
and monitoring all activities. Since it is a small company, management could try to actively
review each employee’s behavior for any red flags as well as verify finances and
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operations. By evaluating and monitoring specifically for fraud, management will be able
to detect correct weak internal controls that could lead to fraudulent activity.

Cost-Benefit Analysis
In our proposal, we present to a small business who is privately owned and less than
100 employees. Unfortunately, a company of this type does not publicly release their
financial statements. We have used the actual financial information from ARAMARK
Corporation in September 2006 when they employed 240,000 individuals (Hoover 53).
ARAMARK is a private company that provides food services and uniform services.
ARAMARK provides the food services for the campus of the University of Mississippi,
Individually, the ARAMARK services offered to the University of Mississippi could be
comparable to a small business. In 2006, ARAMARK’s total revenue was 11,621 million
dollars (Hoover 53). Using the ACFE estimate of five percent revenue lost to fraud each
year, ARAMARK would lose $581,050 of their 2006 revenue. Below in Cost-Benefit
Analysis to reflect the results by implementing a fraud prevention program as described in
the proposal. It should be noted that the three percent and five percent savings are
hypothetical and not proven to be probable. The amount expensed for 2006 is also
hypothetical and includes the cost of the fraud prevention program if executed.

Benefits
No Fraud Prevention Program- No
Savings

Profit Margin 5.76%

Costs
Revenue

11,621,000

Less: Estimated Revenue Lost to Fraud
581,050
Actual Revenue 11,039,950
Expenses 5,000,000
Net Income 6,360,000
Cost Ratio 44%
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Benefits
Fraud Prevention Program- 3% Savings

Program cost of $1000 expensed

Costs
Revenue 11,621,000
Less: Estimated Revenue Lost to
Fraud(2%) 232,420
Actual Revenue 11,388,580
Expenses 5,01,000
Net Income 6,388,580
Cost Ratio 43.9%

Benefits
Costs
Fraud Prevention Program- 5% Savings- Revenue 11,621,000
No Fraud
Less: Estimated Revenue Lost to Fraud 0
Actual Revenue 11,621,000
Program cost of $1000 expensed
Expenses 5,000,000
Net Income 6,621,000
Cost Ratio 43.1%
By implementing a fraud-prevention program, the analysis shows the comparison
of expenses to net revenue estimated by the amount lost by fraud decreases by almost one
percent. As the company grows and revenue increases, they can put more money into the
prevention program if needed or develop the smart phone application.

Anti-Fraud Initiatives
Global Fraud and Initiatives
Every country deals with the element of fraud and its consequences. Using the
Gross Domestic Product(GDP) of the United Kingdom, fraud in the public sector is
estimated to be around $20.6 billion per year(“Annual Fraud Indicator” 8). The UK has
also taken measures through the National Fraud Initiative to help track down fraud as well
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as the implementation of the UK Bribery Act in 2006 (“National Fraud Initiative). The
NFI helped trace 275 million dollars’ worth of fraudulent activity in 2010(National Fraud
Initiative). The graph below displays how the US compares to other countries based on the
number of corruption cases the ACFE analyzed.

Corruption
Cases by Region, 2012
United States
Canada
10 %

8%

Asia
17 %

Europe
15 %
Oceanian
14%

United
Kingdom
7%

Africa
13 %

Latin America
16%
“Corruption Cases by Region”, Report to Nations,2012, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners

Compared to the UK GDP amount, the United States GDP, with five percent of revenue
lost to fraud as mentioned earlier, the present value US GDP from 2013($16,799.7 billion)
would include $839 million lost to fraud. While the United States has struggled
significantly with fraud, it does indicate that we have fewer corruption cases than other
regions.
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Conclusion
In order for auditors to be able to successfully detect fraud during an engagement,
they must be well informed on all aspects of occupational fraud. Studying and analyzing
concepts like attributes of fraudsters, trends of fraud, cybercrime, and fraud prevention
programs could close the Expectations Gap between auditors. In turn, this knowledge can
help plan better for the logistical measures and processes of an engagement team who
might have to conduct a fraud investigation.
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